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BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
I.  
 In 2008, the Borough of Palmyra (“Palmyra”) ordered 
closed for five months an open-air flea market, owned and 
operated by National Amusements, Inc. (“NAI”), due to 
safety concerns posed by unexploded munitions left behind 
when the site had been used as a weapons-testing facility for 
the United States Army.  NAI filed the instant action alleging 
that Palmyra’s action violated its constitutional rights under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Jersey law.  During pendency of 
the action, NAI filed a motion for a preliminary injunction 
requesting that the emergency closure order be lifted.  
Because the parties agreed pursuant to a Consent Order that 
the market could resume operations subject to strict safety 
precautions, that motion was never decided.  On February 3, 
2012, the District Court granted Palmyra’s motion for 
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summary judgment and dismissed the action in its entirety.  
Despite losing the summary judgment motion, NAI declared 
victory on its § 1983 claims based on the earlier Consent 
Order, and sought attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1988.  The District Court denied this motion.  NAI appeals 
both the order granting summary judgment and the order 
denying fees.  We will affirm.   
 
II. 
  From 1976 until the present, NAI has operated an 
open-air flea market (the “Market”) on a 65.4-acre parcel of 
land that NAI’s predecessor had purchased from Palmyra.  
The Market has approximately 458 vendor locations and 
generates significant customer traffic.  In 2002, Palmyra 
began considering a 186-acre redevelopment project which 
included NAI’s parcel.  As part of the project, Palmyra 
contracted with Environment Resources Management 
(“ERM”) to conduct a site inspection of the proposed area.  
That inspection uncovered the possible presence of 
unexploded munitions left over from a weapons-testing 
facility used by the United States Army during and shortly 
after World War II.  Following the initial inspection, ERM 
contracted with Munitions Management Group, LLC 
(“MMG”) to investigate the risk to the public and 
redevelopment efforts and to execute a plan for the safe 
removal of the munitions.  NAI, ERM, and MMG entered into 
an access agreement, pursuant to which NAI would be 
permitted to operate the Market on the weekends, while ERM 
and MMG conducted their inspections and remedial work 
during the week.   
 
 On March 10, 2008, however, MMG discovered an 
unexploded artillery shell flush with the surface of the 
Market’s parking lot, which, because vendors often drove 
stakes into the ground to secure their tents, raised concerns of 
accidental detonation.  That same day, the Borough Council 
of Palmyra issued a resolution authorizing Police Chief 
Richard Dreby to request that NAI voluntarily cease its 
operations, and, if NAI refused, to exercise his emergency 
powers to restrict public access to the Market.  After NAI 
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refused to comply voluntarily, Chief Dreby issued an 
emergency order on March 12, 2008, restricting access to the 
property while MMG conducted further munitions detection 
and disposal.  Over the course of its effort, MMG discovered 
and disposed of hundreds of munitions on the property, both 
explosive and inert.   
 On April 24, 2008, NAI filed the instant action, which 
Palmyra timely removed to federal court.  The Complaint 
alleges that Palmyra’s action (1) was arbitrary and capricious 
under New Jersey law; (2) violated NAI’s right to procedural 
due process; and (3) constituted a “taking” without just 
compensation.  The gist of the Complaint is that Palmyra 
overstated the danger posed by the unexploded munitions as 
pretext to shut down NAI’s economic activity on property 
Palmyra had been eyeing for redevelopment.  NAI contends 
that Palmyra’s failure to enact similar restrictions on adjacent 
property or adopt a less restrictive course of action that could 
have permitted the continued operation of the Market 
demonstrated this surreptitious intent.  NAI sought damages 
and injunctive relief requiring Palmyra to permit the Market 
to reopen and operate as it had for more than thirty years 
without incident.   
 
 On June 6, 2008, NAI filed a motion for a preliminary 
injunction to lift Chief Dreby’s emergency order.  Before the 
District Court could resolve the motion, however, the parties 
agreed that the Market could reopen on the weekends subject 
to certain institutional controls, at NAI’s cost, including 
erecting barriers and hiring security guards to prohibit public 
access to hazardous areas.  Pursuant to the agreement, the 
District Court entered a Consent Order on July 30, 2008, 
whereby the Market could resume operations beginning on 
August 13, 2008.  Both parties have complied with the 
Consent Order, and the Market continues to operate with the 
agreed-upon institutional controls.  The Market was closed as 
a result of Chief Dreby’s emergency order for approximately 
five months.  
 
 For the next two years, the issue that was primarily 
litigated was whether NAI was entitled to $200,000 in interim 
attorney’s fees related to the Consent Order.  On October 8, 
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2010, the District Court denied NAI’s application for fees 
subject to renewal at the end of the case.  On February 3, 
2012, the District Court granted Palmyra’s motion for 
summary judgment.  On May 9, 2012, the District Court 
denied NAI’s motion for attorney’s fees, holding that any 
success NAI had in relation to the Consent Order was based 
on its state law claim not its federal constitutional claims.  
NAI appeals both orders.
1
   
 
III. 
 Our standard of review of a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment is plenary, and we view the facts in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party.  A.W. v. Jersey 
City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).   
 
A. Procedural Due Process 
 NAI claims that Palmyra deprived NAI of due process 
by closing the Market without providing pre-deprivation 
notice or opportunity to be heard.  To state a procedural due 
process claim, NAI must establish (1) that it was deprived of 
an individual interest that is encompassed within the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of life, liberty and 
property, and (2) that the procedures available to it did not 
provide due process of law.  Schmidt v. Creedon, 639 F.3d 
587, 595 (3d Cir. 2011).  NAI cannot establish the second 
prong.   
 
 “[D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, 
place and circumstances.”  Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 
930 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  While 
“[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the 
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner,” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 
(1976) (quotation marks omitted), the Supreme Court “has 
recognized, on many occasions, that where a State must act 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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quickly, or where it would be impractical to provide 
predeprivation process, postdeprivation process satisfies the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause.”  Gilbert, 520 U.S. 
at 930.  The Court has established a three-factor balancing test 
to determine what process is constitutionally due:  
 
First, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest.   
 
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 
 NAI’s private interest in maintaining revenue from the 
continued operation of the Market is substantially outweighed 
by the overwhelming government interest in protecting the 
public safety from the danger posed by unexploded munitions.  
Although the Market had operated without incident for years, 
NAI does not dispute the presence of unexploded munitions.  
Given the imperative of an efficient response to the threat to 
public safety, due process did not require that Palmyra 
provide NAI pre-deprivation notice.  See Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 
932-33 (holding that police officer arrested on drug charges 
was not entitled to notice and hearing prior to being 
suspended without pay because of state’s significant interest 
in the officer’s immediate suspension); N. Am. Cold Storage 
Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 320 (1908) (holding 
that the state did not violate due process by confiscating 
potentially contaminated food without a prior hearing).
2
  Put 
                                                 
2
 NAI attempts to distinguish N. Am. Cold Storage Co. on the 
ground that munitions experts agreed that the risk to the 
public was low.  Appellant’s Br. at 33.  NAI does not, 
however, dispute the existence of unexploded munitions close 
to the surface in a heavily-trafficked area.  Even if NAI’s 
attempt to minimize the potential risk to the public were 
convincing, it is not appropriate for us to weigh the 
immediacy or magnitude of the risk to the public.  Under the 
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simply, a municipality need not conduct a pre-deprivation 
hearing before acting to prevent the public from walking 
around a surface littered with live explosives.  As NAI does 
not argue that the post-deprivation procedures available to it 
were inadequate, summary judgment was properly granted on 
NAI’s procedural due process claim.   
 
B. Takings Clause 
 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides 
that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”  U.S. Const. amend. V. “The 
paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct 
government appropriation or physical invasion of private 
property.”  Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 
(2005).  The government must pay just compensation for such 
takings “except to the extent that ‘background principles of 
nuisance and property law’ independently restrict the owner’s 
intended use of the property.”  Id. (quoting Lucas v. S. C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 (1992)); see Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1032 (“[H]armful or noxious uses of property may be 
proscribed by government regulation without the requirement 
of compensation.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
For instance, “orders temporarily prohibiting access to crime 
scenes, businesses that violate health codes, fire-damaged 
buildings, or other areas that we cannot now foresee . . . have 
long been considered permissible exercises of the police 
power,” which do not entitle the individuals affected to 
compensation.  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 335 (2002).  It is 
difficult to imagine an act closer to the heartland of a state’s 
traditional police power than abating the danger posed by 
unexploded artillery shells.  Palmyra’s emergency action to 
temporarily close the Market therefore constituted an exercise 
of its police power that did not require just compensation.   
 
C. Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writ 
                                                                                                             
circumstances, Palmyra was well within its discretion to act 
quickly to prevent public access to the Market without 
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 NAI also brought an action under New Jersey law “in 
lieu of prerogative writ.” This action permits a “court [to] set 
aside a municipal board decision if it is shown to be arbitrary, 
capricious or unreasonable, not supported in the evidence, or 
otherwise contrary to law.”  Rivkin v. Dover Twp. Rent 
Leveling Bd., 671 A.2d 567, 580-81 (N.J. 1996).  Under New 
Jersey law, a court reviewing an action under this standard 
applies a test of “essentially . . . rational basis.  Arbitrary and 
capricious action . . . means willful and unreasoning action, 
without consideration and in disregard of circumstances.  
Where there is room for two opinions, action is [valid] when 
exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it 
may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been 
reached.”  Worthington v. Fauver, 440 A.2d 1128, 1139 (N.J. 
1982) (alteration in original) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Under this deferential standard, NAI cannot prevail.  
 
 Even if NAI is correct that Palmyra’s public safety 
motive was pretextual, it is undisputed that there were 
unexploded munitions on the property.  While the property 
had been free from incident since 1955, NAI concedes that 
there was at least a “low” risk of injury or death.  Palmyra was 
not required to adopt the option most protective of NAI’s 
rights.  Rather, Palmyra was required to act rationally and not 
arbitrarily and capriciously.  Even if there were valid 
alternatives that would have kept the Market open—such as 
instituting the controls adopted in the Consent Order—no 
reasonable finder of fact could determine that Palmyra acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously by temporarily restricting access to 
NAI’s property.  Accordingly, the District Court properly 
dismissed NAI’s action in lieu of prerogative writ.   
 
IV.  
 NAI also appeals the District Court’s denial of interim 
attorney’s fees.  “We exercise plenary review over legal issues 
relating to the appropriate standard under which to evaluate 
an application for attorneys’ fees. . . .  We review the 
reasonableness of the District Court’s award of attorneys’ fees 
                                                                                                             
holding a hearing. 
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for abuse of discretion.”  People Against Police Violence v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 520 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 
 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, “[i]n any action or 
proceeding to enforce a provision of section[] . . . 1983 . . . of 
this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing 
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee 
as part of the costs.”  Despite having its claims dismissed in 
their entirety and on the merits, NAI claims victory on its § 
1983 claims based on the Consent Order authorizing NAI to 
reopen the Market.  The District Court disagreed, finding that 
although the Consent Order could have conferred “prevailing 
party” status, any success was based only on NAI’s state law 
action, not its constitutional claims.  We will affirm for 
different reasons.
 3
   
 
 A consent order may serve as a basis for awarding 
attorney’s fees.  Parties are considered “prevailing parties” if 
“they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which 
achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing 
suit.”  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).  
Accordingly, “settlement agreements enforced through a 
                                                 
3
 The District Court relied on Luria Bros. & Co. v. Allen, 672 
F.2d 347, 357-58 (3d Cir. 1982), in which we held that a party 
that loses its § 1983 claim does not become a “prevailing 
party” if that party prevails on a related state claim.  The 
Court examined NAI’s moving papers, noting that on the 
“likelihood of success” prong of its argument, NAI “primarily 
argued that Plaintiff will succeed on the merits of the [state] 
claim for an action in lieu of prerogative writ. . . .  Although 
[NAI] also devoted a page to the due process claim, the 
argument was not pursued further.”  J.A. 33.  Therefore, the 
Court concluded that “any success that [NAI] had by way of 
the Consent Order was based only on . . . [the] action in lieu 
of prerogative writ.”  Id.  Because NAI’s brief in support of 
the injunction did reference due process, and the Consent 
Order—as would be expected—did not include a legal basis 
for the resolution, we will not speculate, after the fact, as to 
whether the Consent Order was based solely on NAI’s state 
law claims.   
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consent decree may serve as the basis for an award of 
attorney’s fees.”  Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. 
Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001); 
see P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 853 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (finding that a settlement confers prevailing party 
status “where it alters the legal relationship of the parties and 
is judicially sanctioned”).  We have also held that temporary 
relief may support § 1988 fees, even if the prevailing party 
does not obtain a final judgment in its favor.  People Against 
Police Violence, 520 F.3d at 235-36 (upholding award of 
attorney’s fees where organizer of rally obtained preliminary 
injunction, but new legislation mooted case before final 
judgment).   
 
 We have never held, however, that a party may recover 
attorney’s fees under § 1988 for interim relief when a district 
court ultimately dismisses the party’s § 1983 claims on their 
merits.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Sole v. Wyner, 551 
U.S. 74 (2007) is instructive.  In Sole, the plaintiff challenged 
Florida’s “bathing suit” rule under the First Amendment.  The 
plaintiff also sought preliminary relief permitting a protest the 
next day in which naked participants would form a peace sign 
at a state beach.  Id. at 78.  The district court granted the 
preliminary injunction on the condition that the state could put 
up a barrier to shield beachgoers who did not wish to see the 
nude artwork.  Id. at 79-80.  Ultimately ruling on the merits 
with the benefit of a fuller record, however, the district court 
found that the state’s prohibition on nudity in state parks was 
constitutional, and dismissed the case.  Id. at 80-81.  Because 
the plaintiff had succeeded in securing a preliminary 
injunction, however, the district court awarded her interim § 
1988 attorney’s fees.  Id. at 81.   
 
 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a party that 
obtains preliminary relief is not a “prevailing party” if that 
party loses on the merits a final decision denying permanent 
injunctive relief.  551 U.S. at 84.  The Court rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument that “she got precisely what she wanted 
when she commenced th[e] litigation: permission to create the 
nude peace symbol without state interference.”  Id. at 83.  
Rather, it found “[o]f controlling importance . . . , [that] the 
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eventual ruling on the merits for defendants after both sides 
considered the case fit for final adjudication, superseded the 
preliminary ruling.  [The plaintiff’s] temporary success rested 
on a premise the District Court ultimately rejected.”  Id. at 84-
85.  Accordingly, the Court held that “a plaintiff who 
‘secur[es] a preliminary injunction, then loses on the merits as 
the case plays out and judgment is entered against [her], has 
‘[won] a battle but los[t] the war.”  Id. at 86 (quoting Watson 
v. Cnty. of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002)).   
 
 So too here.  The Consent Order resolving the motion 
for a preliminary injunction motion did grant some of the 
relief sought by NAI: the reopening of the Market.  To the 
extent that NAI achieved success in securing the Consent 
Order based on its constitutional claims, however, these 
claims “rested on a premise the District Court ultimately 
rejected.”  Id. at 85.  Once the case was deemed fit by both 
parties for final adjudication, the Court denied NAI’s § 1983 
claims on their merits; the “same claim[s] [NAI] advanced in 
[its] preliminary injunction motion.”  Id. at 86; see also 
People Against Police Violence, 520 F.3d at 234 (noting that 
where initial relief proves fleeting, attorney's fees are 
inappropriate).  NAI may have won a battle, but it lost the 
war.
4
   
                                                 
4
 It is not entirely clear that NAI even won a battle.  The relief 
achieved by the Consent Order was not the specific relief NAI 
sought in its Complaint: reopening the Market which it had 
operated for the last thirty years.  Rather, the Order reopened 
the Market on the condition that NAI undertake controls to 
eliminate the safety risk.  The result could also be viewed as a 
success for Palmyra or, simply, a reasonable interim solution 
while the parties awaited a determination by the Court.  See 
Biodiversity Conservation Alliance v. Stern, 519 F.3d 1226, 
1232 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that temporary relief that won 
the “right to have the status quo preserved,” did not make the 
plaintiff a prevailing party once the claims were dismissed).  
Indeed, the parties expressly agreed that the Consent Order 
was “not meant to waive any rights that any of the parties 
currently have in law or in equity or which may be later 
obtained.”  J.A. 235.  In other words, the Consent Order did 
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 “The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure ‘effective access 
to the judicial process’ for persons with civil rights 
grievances.”  Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 (1983) (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976)).  This purpose is not furthered 
by awarding fees when a plaintiff includes constitutional 
claims in its complaint and achieves a modicum of interim 
relief before these claims can be disposed of on the merits.  
Indeed, were that to become the practice, plaintiffs might be 
encouraged to include meritless § 1983 claims to leverage 
their negotiating positions, hardly the purpose of § 1988.  The 
District Court properly denied attorney’s fees.    
 
V. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
order of the District Court granting Palmyra’s motion for 
summary judgment and its order denying interim attorney’s 
fees to NAI.   
                                                                                                             
not purport to resolve any of the merits of NAI’s 
constitutional claims.  By proceeding to summary judgment, 
the parties left that determination to the final order of the 
District Court.    
